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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4046 
___________ 
 
THOMAS W. THOMPSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DAVID W. PITKINS; DANIEL P. BURNS; JOHN S. PAUL; 
TIMOTHY PLEACHER; ELIZABETH NIGHTINGALE; 
JACK LOUGHRY; DORINA VARNER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:12-cv-00166) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 7, 2013 
 
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion file: February 22, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Thomas W. Thompson, an inmate currently incarcerated at SCI Laurel Highlands 
in Somerset, Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United 
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States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing his complaint 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim.  For the reasons discussed 
below, we will summarily affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further 
proceedings.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In 2009, Thompson was transferred from SCI Somerset, a Level 
Three prison, to SCI Laurel Highlands, a Level Two prison.  In April 2010, he requested 
an incentive-based transfer to another Department of Corrections (“DOC”) facility.  
Thompson’s request was denied based upon the finding that he had only been housed at a 
Level Two facility for five months.  He submitted a grievance challenging the denial and 
was subsequently placed into a high-intensity violence prevention program.  Thompson’s 
grievance was denied based upon his refusal to participate in the high-intensity violence 
prevention program.  He appealed the denial; however, his appeal was returned to him by 
the mailroom and ultimately denied as untimely. 
 In August 2010, Thompson filed his civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 with the District Court.  In his complaint, he alleges that Appellees retaliated 
against him by denying his transfer request because of his use of the inmate grievance 
system.  He also asserts that Appellees violated his due process rights by not providing a 
fair process under DOC policy to apply for an incentive-based transfer and receive fair 
grievance proceedings.  On September 5, 2012, a Magistrate Judge recommended 
dismissal of Thompson’s suit for failure to state a claim.  On September 24, 2012, the 
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District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed Thompson’s complaint 
without leave to amend.  Thompson timely filed this appeal.  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  The complaint “must not be ‘so undeveloped that it does not 
provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by [Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8].’”  Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
As an initial matter, the District Court correctly dismissed Thompson’s due 
process claims.  First, Thompson alleged that officials violated his due process rights by 
denying him the opportunity to receive an incentive-based transfer.  However, prisoners 
have no liberty interest arising from the Due Process Clause in a particular place of 
confinement.  See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1983).  Thompson has 
alleged nothing that might make the denial of his request actionable under the 
circumstances presented. 
Second, Thompson alleged that officials violated his due process rights by denying 
him a fair process in the adjudication of his various grievances.  However, Thompson has 
not demonstrated that the process used amounted to an “atypical and significant hardship 
. . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”  Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 
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484 (1995); see also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures); Hoover v. 
Watson, 886 F. Supp. 410, 418 (D. Del. 1995), aff’d, 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); 
Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (same).  Accordingly, 
Appellees’ alleged misapplication of these procedures is not independently actionable. 
 However, we cannot agree with the District Court that Thompson’s complaint 
failed to state “sufficient factual matter” to support the plausibility of his retaliation 
claim.  Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678.  In Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003), 
we explained that “[a] prisoner alleging retaliation must show (1) constitutionally 
protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a person of 
ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between 
the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”  
Thompson’s allegation that prison officials violated his First Amendment right to present 
grievances by denying his petition requesting an incentive-based transfer might state a 
claim for retaliation.  See Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866-67 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(determining that the plaintiff’s complaint was prematurely dismissed because he had 
properly asserted a claim for retaliation for alleged violations of his right to use the prison 
grievance system). 
 Furthermore, while the District Court did not mention the statute of limitations, the 
Magistrate Judge noted that Thompson’s retaliation claim was untimely under the 
applicable limitations period.  Thompson’s claim is governed by 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.  See Ahmed v. 
5 
 
Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2002).  Because exhaustion of prison 
administrative remedies is mandatory under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the statute 
of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions may be tolled while a prisoner exhausts.  See 
Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 
522 (7th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Morgan, 209 F.3d 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2000).  Ordinarily, 
the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and which is 
subject to waiver.  See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008).  Furthermore, 
a district court “may not sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s § 1983 action on the basis of the 
statute of limitations unless it is clear from the face of the complaint that there are no 
meritorious tolling issues, or the court has provided the plaintiff notice and an 
opportunity to be heard.”  Vasquez Arroyo v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(citing Abbas v. Lt. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 It appears that Thompson had the opportunity to respond to the limitations issue 
because he addressed it in his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 
Recommendation.  However, we note that it is unclear from the face of the complaint 
whether the limitations period would bar Thompson’s retaliation claim.  Under federal 
law, a § 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of 
action.”  Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (citations omitted).  Thompson’s 
complaint alleges that he completed the grievance process in September 2010.  
Furthermore, as noted above, the limitations period may be tolled while Thompson was 
exhausting his administrative remedies.  See Brown, 422 F.3d at 942-43; Johnson, 272 
F.3d at 522; Brown, 209 F.3d at 596.  We express no view as to whether Thompson will 
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eventually plead a meritorious retaliation claim or whether defenses, such as the statute of 
limitations, will prove to be dispositive. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm in part and vacate in part the 
District Court’s order dismissing Thompson’s complaint and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
